Tutorial 5

Field Experiments

TABLE 2. Preferences over Projects

	Female Individual	Male Heads of Household
Drinking water		
Irrigation		
Schools		
Health facilities		
Roads and bridges		
Electricity		
Other		
Observations	3368	4968

Notes: Percent of respondents who think that the corresponding type of project is the most needed by the community.

TABLE 2. Preferences over Projects

	Female Individual	Male Heads of Household
Drinking water	40.5	29.9
Irrigation	2.7	13.7
Schools	14.8	15.9
Health facilities	16.4	13.7
Roads and bridges	6.2	14.0
Electricity	7.0	6.3
Other	12.3	6.5
Observations	3368	4968

Notes: Percent of respondents who think that the corresponding type of project is the most needed by the community.

Read

- The subsection titled “National Solidarity Program (NSP)” under the section titled **“SETTING”** (pp.543-544).
- The following parts of the section titled **“DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT”** (pp.544-545).
  - The opening paragraph (p.544).
  - The subsection titled **“Sample”** (p.544-545).
  - The first and last paragraphs of the subsections titled **“Assignment of** Treatment” (p.545).
    - The first paragraph starts with “In each of the ten districts, 50 villages…”
    - The last paragraph starts with “The randomization procedure was successful…”
  - The subsection titled **“Data Sources”** under the section titled **“DATA”** (p.547).

Questions

- **Who are the participants in the experiment (i.e., the unit of analysis)?**
- **What are the experimental treatments (stimuli or manipulations)? How are different treatments assigned to the participants? In other words, how is the independent variable operationalized?**
- **How are the outcomes (i.e., the dependent variable) measured?**

Access: jacobawinter.github.io/files/tut5.pdf

Read: Results

- The subsection titled “Female Participation in Local Governance” under the section titled “RESULTS” (pp.548-549).

- **Substantively interpret the findings of the experiment based on the following survey items reported in Tables 3 and 4 (pp.549-550). Focus on the columns titled “Mean in Control,” which report the proportion of respondents who agree with each statement in the control group, and“Treatment Effect,” which shows the difference in proportions of respondents who agree with each statement between the treatment and control groups.**
  In other words, the proportion of respondents who agree with each statement in the treatment group is the sum of the values in “Mean in Control”and “Treatment Effect.”

TABLE 3. Functionality of Women’s Council

Variable	Mean in Control	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Number of Observations	R squared
A. Female Focus Group Participants					
There exists a village or pan-village women’s council	0.05	0.391***	[0.044]	424	0.69

TABLE 3. Functionality of Women's Council

Variable	Mean in Control	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Number of Observations	R squared
A. Female Focus Group Participants					
There exists a village or pan-village women's council	0.05	0.391***	[0.044]	424	0.69
The women's council had at least one meeting in the past six months	0.04	0.391***	[0.043]	424	0.64
Village women held meeting with district government in past 12 months	0.00	0.042**	[0.016]	424	0.64
Village women held meeting with women from other villages in past 12 months	0.03	0.078***	[0.023]	424	0.67
Summary measure for female focus group	0.00	1.211***	[0.120]	424	0.70
B. Individual Female Respondents					
There is at least one woman in the village who is well respected by both men and women	0.30	0.076***	[0.015]	4,225	0.29
C. Individual Male Respondents					
There is at least one woman in the village who is well respected by both men and women	0.32	0.087***	[0.013]	4,656	0.18

Notes: The treatment effect is estimated in the regression, which includes matched pairs fixed effects and a dummy variable for villages that have been assigned to the treatment group. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

TABLE 4. Attitudes toward Women's Participation in Village Governance

Variable	Mean in Control	Treatment Effect	Standard Error	Number of Observations	R squared
A. Individual Female Respondents					
Women should be members of the village council and participate with men on equal terms in decision making	0.25	−0.001	[0.014]	4,234	0.18
Women should have no council and no role in village decision making	0.13	−0.018**	[0.009]	4,234	0.14
Women should participate in the selection of the village headman	0.35	0.029*	[0.016]	3,628	0.23
Summary measure for female respondents	0.00	0.037**	[0.015]	4,234	0.16
B. Male Respondents					
Women should be members of the village council and participate with men on equal terms in decision making	0.16	−0.018*	[0.010]	4,568	0.30
Women should have no council and no role in village decision making	0.06	−0.025***	[0.008]	4,568	0.09
Women should participate in the selection of the village headman	0.38	0.072***	[0.014]	4,577	0.28
Summary measure for male respondents	0.00	0.073***	[0.020]	4,661	0.26

Notes: The treatment effect is estimated in the regression, which includes matched-pairs fixed effects and a dummy variable for villages that have been assigned to the treatment group. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

External Validity

- The intervention was not a hypothetical or artificial manipulation — it was a real development program implemented by the Afghan government. The outcomes measured reflect actual responses to this real-world program, which strengthens the relevance and applicability of the findings.

  Suppose some researchers have raised concerns about the external validity of the sample, noting that the study was conducted in only 10 out of approximately 400 administrative districts across Afghanistan. They argue that this limited geographic scope undermines the generalizability of the results and suggest that the experiment should have been conducted nationwide.

- How would you respond to these researchers' criticisms? Offer an argument to defend the authors' experiment.

External Validity

- Ethics: Is it unfair that villages in the control group and villages outside the experiment were excluded from the benefit?
  - Why yes?
  - Why not?

Field Experiments

Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq

SALMA MOUSA Authors Info & Affiliations

SCIENCE · 14 Aug 2020 · Vol 369, Issue 6505 · pp. 866-870 · DOI: 10.1126/science.abb3153

Social contact and reconciliation

It has been theorized that positive intergroup relations can reduce prejudice and facilitate peace. However, supporting empirical evidence is weak, particularly in the context of real-world conflict. Mousa randomized Christian Iraqi refugees to soccer teams that were composed of either all Christian players or a mixture of Christian and Muslim players (see the Perspective by Paluck and Clark). Playing on the same team as Muslims had positive effects on Christian players' attitudes and behaviors toward Muslims within the context of soccer, but these effects did not generalize to non-soccer contexts. These findings have implications for the potential benefits and limits of positive intergroup contact for achieving peace between groups.

Science, this issue p. 866; see also p. 769

RESEARCH ARTICLE | POLITICAL SCIENCES |

Parochialism, social norms, and discrimination against immigrants

Donghyun Danny Choi, Mathias Poertner, and Nicholas Sambanis Authors Info & Affiliations

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Kim, 2023
Lab Experiment

Entertaining Beliefs in Economic Mobility

Eunji Kim Vanderbilt University

Abstract: *Americans have long believed in upward mobility and the narrative of the American Dream. Even in the face of rising income inequality and substantial empirical evidence that economic mobility has declined in recent decades, many Americans remain convinced of the prospects for upward mobility. What explains this disconnect? I argue that their media diets play an important role in explaining this puzzle. Specifically, contemporary Americans are watching a record number of entertainment TV programs that emphasize "rags-to-riches" narratives. I demonstrate that such shows have become a ubiquitous part of the media landscape over the last two decades. Online and lab-in-the-field experiments as well as national surveys show that exposure to these programs increases viewers' beliefs in the American Dream and promotes internal attributions of wealth. Media exemplars present in what Americans leisurely consume every day can powerfully distort economic perceptions and have important implications for public preferences for economic redistribution.*

Figure I1. The mobile media laboratory



Habyarimana et al, 2007

Lab Experiment

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?

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JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN *Stanford University*

A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—what we term "preferences," "technology," and "strategy selection" mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

FIGURE 1. Public Information Box with Nonanonymous Offerer



Note: Player 2, the offerer, is "seen" by all players. Note that the images used in this figure are for illustration purposes only and are not the images of actual subjects.

FIGURE 2. Public Information Box with Anonymous Offerer



Note: Player 2, the offerer, is anonymous. Note that the images used in this figure are for illustration purposes only and are not the images of our subjects.